Trump foreign policy in downward spiral

By Hal Brands

AS U.S. President Donald Trump nears the fourth year of his presidency, he confronts the damage wrought by his own policies almost everywhere. The Trump administration has maneuvered itself into diplomatic cul-de-sacs with Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. It has undermined its own efforts to end the war in Afghanistan.

The economic damage from Trump’s trade war with China is mounting, and Beijing shows few signs of giving in. At the same time, the president’s laceration of alliances leaves the United States weaker and more isolated.

For three years, Trump has played fast and loose with American power—picking fights with little thought to how and whether the United States can win them, damaging relationships he needs to accomplish his objectives, and shunning the systematic policy work that superpowers must embrace. The cost of this negligence is finally coming due.

Things could get worse in 2020. The president has always styled himself as the ultimate deal-maker, and his desire for diplomatic breakthroughs will grow as the presidential election approaches. Yet U.S. competitors can see that Trump is in a tight spot, so they will offer him a choice between bad deals and no deals. They may even pursue escalatory strategies to dial up the pressure on a floundering superpower. A few constructive initiatives notwithstanding, the overall trajectory of Trump’s foreign policy has been steadily downward.

Bad choices

Trump’s foreign policy has unfolded in phases, corresponding to each of his years in office. In 2017, the “axis of adults”—principally Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster—constrained some, if not all, of Trump’s most disruptive impulses.

In 2018, Trump broke free, installing more pliant advisers and pursuing his own policy priorities—such as withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal and imposing punitive tariffs on allies.

The current year, 2019, has been the year of living dangerously, as Trump’s ill-considered and sometimes contradictory policies have started to catch up with him. And 2020 is shaping up to be the year of bad choices: one in which Trump’s gambits finally unravel and his options diminish.

Consider the state of U.S. policy toward the three rogue regimes that have consumed so much of the administration’s attention. In Venezuela, President Nicolas Maduro is entrenching himself for the long haul, and Trump’s threats to use force to bring about regime change have been exposed as cheap bluster.

Similarly, in North Korea, the president’s mix of maximum pressure and maximum engagement has failed to deliver progress toward denuclearization, leaving him clinging to the fantasy that he has solved that problem even as Pyongyang improves its nuclear and missile arsenals.

And in the Persian Gulf, Trump’s abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal has backfired: Iran responded to American sanctions with its own maximum pressure campaign, attacking tankers in the Gulf, downing a U.S. drone, and carrying out a dramatic assault on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. The resulting crisis has rattled the global oil market and revealed that Trump had little desire for the showdown his confrontational policies were bound to provoke. His administration is now torn between efforts to intensify the pressure on Iran and Trump’s own desire to launch negotiations to bring Tehran back into the compliance with the deal he scuttled.

Trump’s policies have run into trouble elsewhere, as well.

buy doxycycline online no prescription pharmacy
online pharmacy no prescription pharmacy

In Afghanistan, the president is searching, reasonably enough, for a way to negotiate an end to that conflict, but he has simultaneously undermined his diplomats by telegraphing his desire to withdraw U.S. troops before November 2020.

And contrary to Trump’s boast that trade wars are easy to win, his commercial conflict with China has not played out as planned. Reciprocal tariff hikes are surely doing real damage to the Chinese economy, but they are also increasing the recessionary pressures on the U.S. economy. Having initially sought to cut a deal, the Chinese government now shows little interest in the economic grand bargain that Trump reportedly seeks.

online pharmacy no prescription pharmacy

The president deserves credit for taking a harder line against a rising challenger, and the Pentagon’s China-focused defense strategy is a positive step. But in nearly three years, the Trump administration has still not developed a comprehensive approach for competing with China—in part because Washington’s attention is on Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran.

At a time of great upheaval, even a superpower needs allies. But Trump’s public attacks on allied leaders; unilateral abandonment of international agreements; and punitive tariffs against close U.S. allies have weakened the relationships that Washington will need to confront short-term crises like the one in the Persian Gulf as well as longer-term threats from China and Russia.

U.S. allies in Europe have hesitated to follow Trump’s lead in resisting Chinese domination of the world’s 5G telecommunications networks, for example, in part because of the Trump administration’s allergy to meaningful consultation and in part because they worry that the U.S. president will ultimately make a bilateral trade deal with Beijing, leaving them isolated.

Similarly, European allies have distanced themselves from Trump’s confrontation with Tehran (although they now agree with the U.S. assessment that Iran was behind the attacks on Saudi Arabia), while mounting a longer-run effort to blunt U.S. financial power by creating mechanisms to bypass American sanctions.

Foreign policy is ultimately about results, though, and this administration has relatively little to show on many of the issues that the president has put front and centre. This is not especially surprising. Since Trump took office, he has combined disdain for the block-and-tackle work of policymaking—setting objectives and priorities, connecting goals to capabilities, realistically assessing U.S. competitors as well as the geopolitical environment, negotiating in a systematic and disciplined manner—with an offense-in-all-directions approach that generates multiple crises while weakening the United States’ overall diplomatic effectiveness. The price of that approach is now apparent.


An ordinary administration would take this moment to repair the policymaking process and steady the ship of state. But Trump’s hollowed-out administration, in which turnover is rampant and dozens of mid- and upper-level posts remain vacant, is ill equipped for a serious turnaround.

The president recently appointed a new national security adviser, Robert O’Brien, and a well-respected Asia adviser, Matthew Pottinger, as deputy national security adviser.

buy antabuse online no prescription pharmacy

Yet it seems unlikely that these officials will have a real mandate for change.

online pharmacy no prescription pharmacy

The national security process ultimately reflects the president’s personality, and so far Trump has shown himself incapable of the introspection required to admit when his policies are failing or the discipline needed to devise and execute effective statecraft. Personnel may change in the late innings of Trump’s presidency, but the quality of policy probably won’t improve dramatically.

As a result, 2020 is likely to be a rough year in U.S. foreign policy. The United States will face multiple crises and critical decisions at once. Handling several challenges simultaneously is hard enough when an administration is firing on all cylinders. The difficulty multiplies when the team in power is short-handed and the president behaves erratically. At best, then, the United States will limp through 2020, stumbling from crisis to crisis, struggling to shape events and use its vast power effectively.

– Foreign Affairs